This paper presents a generalization of a game.theoretic model, first described in an earlier paper, of the relationship between an inspectee who may decide to "cheat" or not, and an inspector whose task it is to minimize the expected gain that the inspectee achieves by cheating. When cheating is detected by the inspector, a penalty is assessed against the inspectee. The generalized model permits imposing a relationship between the level of the penalty to the inspectee when he/she is caught and the value to the inspectee of not being caught when he/she is cheating. The solution of the game takes on different forms depending on whether or not the inspector's resources are sufficient to make the detection of cheating likely.
Introduction
In an earlier paper [2] ,1 the authors presented three simple mathematical models of game-theoretic type, with the aim of exploring "strategic" aspects of the inspector-inspectee relationship. These models arose in the context of a study performed for the NBS Office of Weights and Measures, and were tailored to fit the specific situation encountered there. We also discussed a number of possible directions for generalizing the models in order to make them relevant to other situations involving an inspector-inspectee relationship.
Shortly thereafter, the opportunity arose to investigate the inspector-inspectee relationship inherent between the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers. Indeed, the direct impetus for the current study was an attempt to apply the models of [2] to the problems faced by the Audit Division of IRS when trying to promote compliance by taxpayers to the Income Tax Regulations [1] . In each of the models of [2] , the penalty imposed on the inspectee when cheating is detected by the inspector was assumed to be the same in all cases (P) . For the purposes of [1] , we were obliged to investigate the consequences of dropping that assumption: in particular, of relating the level of the penalty to the magnitude of the gain from cheating (if undetected). The present paper's model is sufficiently general to permit introducing such a relationship.
The definitions, notation, terminology, etc. used in [2] are retained here. Although it has been necessary to repeat parts of the earlier paper in order to make this one self-contained, this has been kept to a minimum. For this reason we recommend that the reader become familiar with the earlier paper, whose sections 1 and 2 describe the general aim of this line of research as well as (on p. 192) the motivation for ~he extension treated here.
Formulation of the Model
This mathematical model takes the form of a 2-player zero-sum game. The "players" are the inspector (an aggregate representing the inspection agency) and the inspectee (an aggregate representing all those whom it is the inspector's province to inspect). Goldman and Shier [3] have shown that in a non-cooperative game, with payoff functions satisfying an assumption obeyed by (2.4) below, such an aggregation of players into a single unit does not change the solution of the game.
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As in [2] , the inspectee can either cheat, or not, for each of a set of devices, D I , D'!., '" , Dn' (These "devices" might be the measuring devices in n retail establishments, or the tax returns of n individuals.) The inspector selects some of these devices for inspection, up to the limit of his/her resources. The detection of a cheat, if the device is inspected, is assumed to be certain. We set:
the number of devices available to the inspectee, the payoff to the inspectee from cheating on D;, the penalty imposed on the inspectee when cheating is detected on D;, the number of devices that the inspector can inspect.
We assume that m <n, and that all V; and P; are positive. It will be convenient to number the devices so that (2.1)
A strategy for the inspectee is an n-component vector where C; is the probability that the inspectee will cheat on D;. A pure strategy for the inspector is the specification of a subset M of the set N={I, 2, ... , n}, where i E M denotes that D; is inspected. Then, a (mixed) strategy for the inspector is a vector p = (p(M), where
With each such p we associate the quantities
Since C i and Pi represent probabilities, we must have
There is no further restriction on c. However, as was shown in [2] , the limitation of the inspector's resources 2 (m) which prevents him/her from inspecting all of the devices (n) can be expressed as
The net expected payoff to the inspectee from device Di is the expected gain from cheating minus the expected penalty, i.e. Thus, the total net expected payoff to the inspectee when the two players choose strategies c and p respectively, is n From the "zero-sum" assumption that the interests of the two players are diametrically opposed, it follows that -F(c,p) is the expected payoff to the inspector. (Two of the three models in [2] involve alternatives to this assumption, but we shall retain it here.)
For each i, i = 1, 2, ... , n, define qi by Then the objective function (2.4) can be rewritten as
As in [2] , we set N={1, 2, ... , n} and let
(2.5) (2.6) Thus, T represents the set of "tempting" devices, those on which the inspectee can profit from cheating even if the cheating is detected. For any subset S of N, we denote the number of members of S by I S I.
Also, we set and hence the above settings can be extended to yield a strategy pO for the inspector such that
Thus the hypothesis of (ii) can be satisfied. Set F ° = V(1)-P (1) and let c be any strategy for the inspectee.
It follows from (2.4) and (2.5) that
Now let CO be any strategy for the inspectee satisfying the conditions of (iii). Then, for any strategy p for the inspector,
Combining equations (3.1) and (3.2), we have
for all p and for all c. Hence the value of the game is F 0, po is an optimal strategy for the inspector and CO is an optimal strategy for the inspectee. We now wish to determine whether or not there are any other optimal strategies. In Theorems 2 and 3
we will show that when m> IT U WI +q(lf) then no other optimal strategies exist for either player. However, when m = IT U WI +q(U) then another class of optimal strategies for the inspectee exists. Consider a strategy c for the inspectee for which:
Then
Thus pO is not optimal. This is a contradiction and so we have shown that
for allj E U.
The converse is part (ii) of Theorem 1.
We wish to show that if m> IT U WI +q(U), then every optimal strategy for the inspectee is given by (iii) of Theorem 1. The proof of the following Lemma is trivial.
, then there exists a strategy p for the inspector such that
, then c is an optimal strategy for the inspectee if and only if
PROOF. Let CO be an optimal strategy for the inspectee and suppose that there exists JET for which cj < 1. By eq (3.1) where pO is the strategy for the inspector define in Theorem 1. Hence CO is not optimal. This is a contradiction and thus
for allj E T.
Similarly, suppose that there exists j E U such that Let p be the strategy for the inspector described in the Lemma. By equation (3.1)
Hence CO is not optimal. This is again a contradiction and so we have shown that
The converse follows from (iii) of Theorem 1. 
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Let b=min (qj' I-qh)· Since h,j E U, it follows that b>O. Define the strategy p for the inspector by
Note that p is a strategy vector since
It follows from eq (2.4) and Corollary 1 that
This is a contradiction of the optimality of CO and hence we have shown that Let m = IT U WI +q(U) and let CO be an optimal strategy for the inspectee. Since m <n it follows that U is not empty. By Lemma 2 there exists a number M(cO) such that M(cO)=e~Ph for all h E U. LDIMA 3. Let m= IT U WI +q(U) and let CO be an optimal strategy for the inspeetee. Then
for all i fT.
PROOF. Let j E U and suppose there exists hEW such that Define the strategy pfor the inspector by
Then, using Corollary 1, we have
This is a contradiction and hence
Now suppose that there exists h E T such that
With pthe strategy vector for the inspector as defined above, we have
since PhcZ <Ph <M(cO). Again we have reached a contradiction and thus we have for all i E T.
We are now able to determine all of the optimal strategies CO for the inspectee in the special case where m=IT U WI+q(U). 
for all for all for all for all
PROOF. The necessity of the conditions follows from Corollary 1; Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Now let CO be a vector satisfying the conditions of the theorem. Then, for any strategy p for the inspector,
for all i e T.
Hence F(cO,p)-F°;>O for all p and so CO is an optimal strategy for the inspectee. COROLLARY 2. Let m = IT U WI +q(l!) and let M be a real number. A necessary and sufficient condition that there is an optimal strategy CO for the inspectee such that M(cO)=M is that 0<; M <; min Pi. 
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Conversely, let M be any number such that O<M< min; P; and define CO by c7 = 1
Then CO is the desired optimal strategy for the inspectee.
This completes the case in which the inspector's resources are at least adequate for the job of inspecting the devices under his/her jurisdiction. The value of such a game is F ° = V(1)-P(1), which is independent of m. The inspectee cannot, of course, be prevented from benefitting by cheating on the tempting devices (1), but he/she gains nothing (or actually decreases his/her expectation) by cheating on the other devices (U U W). When the inspector's resources are just barely adequate for his/her responsibilities (i.e. m = IT U WI +q(U)), the inspectee has a wider variety of optimal strategies to choose from (e.g., including cheating on the devices in U U 117 with probabilities inversely proportional to the associated penalties) but the value of the game remains the same. We now turn to the case of inadequate inspection resources.
Case II
The defining relation for Case II, which describes the inspection resources as being below a certain adequacy threshold, is
Recall that in (2.1) we have numbered the devices so that It follows from (4.1) that there exists an integer k, O<k <n, such that
If the P;'s are not distinct then the condition of (2.1) does not assign a number to each device in a unique manner. This ambiguity in numbering the devices may in turn affect the value of k as defined by (4.2). However, the subsequent material does not depend on which of the possible numberings obeying (4.2) is used. Once k has been determined, we set L = {i I P; < Pl + 1}
Note that G, E and L are independent of which of the possible numberings of the devices obeying (2.1) has been used. Clearly E is not empty, although either G or L might be. Set K ={1,2, ... , k} with the
Then, setting
we have
We will show that is the value of the game.
LEMMA 4. Let FO be defined as in (4.5) and let pO be any strategy for the inspector which satisfies
Then F°;;"F(c,pO)for all strategies cfor the inspectee.
PROOF. It follows as a consequence of (i), (ii) and (4.3) that Substituting (i) and (ii) into (2.4), we have
But Vj-Pjqj=O for all i E G n f. It follows from (4.5) and (iv) that
.
iEGnT iEE iEL
However. q; -1 > 0 for i E G n T and, by (iii), for all i E E. 
204
,-.oJ
for all i f L,
PROOF. It follows immediately from (4.6) that conditions (v) through (vii) form a set of sufficient conditions that F(C',p)=Fo for all strategies P which satisfy conditions (i) through (iv).
Since qi-1>0 for all i f G n T and Vi>O for all i E L, (4.6) also shows that (v) and (vi) are necessary conditions that F(~p) =F ° for all strategies p satisfying (i) through (iv). It remains to show that condition (vii) is also necessary. By (4.4), for each j f E there exists a strategy for the inspector, pi, satisfying (i) through (iv) and such that p~ < min(l, q).
Then By (4.6), in order that F('C:pi)=Fo, it is necessary that Cj= 1. Hence we have shown that condition (vii) is also necessary. 
LEMMA 5. If'C is any strategy for the inspectee which satisfies conditions (v) through (vii) of

Ifc is any strategy for the inspectee which satisfies conditions (v) through (vii) and, in addition,
satisfies
PROOF. Let c be a strategy for the inspectee which satisfies (v) through (vii). Substituting (v) through (vi) into (2.4), we have
and so the last equation becomes
and consequently we are left with
(P/c-:
If c is a strategy for the inspectee which satisfies condition (viii) then for all i E Gnu.
Thus, if c satisfies conditions (v) through (viii) then eq (4.7) becomes (4.8).
It follows from equation (4.8) that:
COROLLARY 4. If CO is a strategy for the inspectee which satisfies conditions (v) through (viii) and also satisfies for all i E G n W, then F(cO,p»Fo for all p.
We can now describe the solution of the game in Case II.
THEOREM 5. (a) The value of the game is FO. (b) If pO is a strategy for the inspector which satisfies (i) through (iv) then pO is optimal. (c) If CO is a strategy for the inspectee which satisfies (v) through (ix) then CO is optimal.
PROOF. First we wish to show that there exist strategies pO and CO which satisfy conditions (i) through (iii) and (v) through (ix) respectively. It is readily verified that if pO is defined by
then pO is a strategy for the inspector and pO satisfies (i) through (iv).
Similarly, if CO is defined by ° 1 for all i e G n T,
then CO is a strategy for the inspectee and CO satisfies (v) through (ix).
The Theorem now follows from Lemma 4 and Corollary 4. Theorem 5 provides sets of sufficient conditions for stategies of each of the players to be optimal. In Theorem 6 we will show that the converse of part (b) of Theorem 5 holds, that is, conditions (i) through (iv) are both necessary and sufficient for a strategy for the inspector to be optimal. However, conditions (v) through (ix) are not necessary for a strategy for the inspectee to be optimal. In Theorems 7 and 8 we will provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that a strategy for the inspectee be optimal.
COROLLARY 5. If CO is an optimal strategy for the inspectee then CO satisfies conditions (v) through (vii). PROOF. Let CO be an optimal strategy for the inspectee and let p be any strategy for the inspector which satisfies conditions (i) through (iv). By Theorem 5 (b), p is an optimal strategy for the inspector. By
Theorem 5 (a), F(co,p)=Fo and by Corollary 3, CO satisfies conditions (v) through (vii).
We can now identify all of the optimal strategies for the inspector. THEOREM 6. The strategy pO for the inspector is optimal if and only if pO satisfies conditions (i) through
(iv).
PROOF. By Theorem 5 (b), a strategy pO for the inspector which satisfies conditions (i) through (iv) is optimal. Conversely, let pO be an optimal strategy for the inspector and let CO be a strategy for the inspectee which satisfies conditions (v) through (viii) and also for all i E G n W.
Since condition (x) is stronger than condition (ix), it follows from Theorem 5 (c) that CO is optimal. It then follows from Theorem 5 (a) that F(co,pO)=Fo. Consequently, eq (4.8) becomes
But
Thus, we must have
(4.9)
(4.10) Now, for each h E G n T we define two strategies for the inspectee, c" and c h , as follows:
'"t' and c" satisfy conditions (v) through (vii) ,...;, -"
Since pO is an optimal strategy for the inspector we have
Sincec" and c" satisfy conditions (v) through (vii), we may apply Lemma 5. Substituting eq (4.9) and (4.10) into eq (4.7), we have from which it follows that
We have now shown that po satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) and consequently, as in Lemma 4, we have
It remains only to prove that po satisfies condition (iii).
Suppose that there exists r E E for which p:>qr. We define the strategy c r for the inspectee by c r satisfies conditions (v), (vi) and (viii),
that is, c r differs from the strategy c of Lemma 5 for the inspectee only in that c;=O whereas c r = 1. By a computation similar to that of Lemma 5, we find
However, since pO is an optimal strategy, we must have This is a contradiction and so we have shown that for all i E E, which proves that pO satisfies condition (iii). It remains to find a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that a strategy for the inspectee be optimal.
LEMMA 6. If CO is an optimal strategy for the inspectee then CO satisfies for all i E G n T.
PROOF. For j E E, let pj be the optimal strategy for the inspector defined in Corollary 3, that is, pj satisfies conditions (i) through (iv) and p~ < min(l, q).
Consider any h E G n T; it follows from condition (i) that
We choose any u such that o < u < min(qh' 1 -p~ and define the (not optimal) strategy p by
Since CO is an optimal strategy, and, by Corollary 5, CO satisfies conditions (v) through (vii). By eq (4.7), l:
and so CO satisfies condition (xi).
LEMMA 7. If CO is an optimal strategy for the inspectee then there exists a real number M(cO);>O such that
for all i E G n w.
PROOF. If GnU is empty then, by Lemma 6, 0 will do for M(cO). Hence we assume that there exists
Let pO be an optimal strategy for the inspector and define p by p"
By eq (4.7), we have Since CO is an optimal strategy, Hence We set Thus we have shown that for all i E G n T.
If h (as well as J) belongs to GnU then this argument can be repeated with j and h interchanged. Thus for all h, j E Gnu.
By Lemma 6, M(cO)
PROOF. Since Gnu is not empty, we may select j E Gnu. Let pO be an optimal strategy for the inspector. Since g> 0, (iv) shows that there exists h E E such that Choose a real number u such that ° < u < min (p~, 1 -q) and define the strategy p for the inspector by p" 
Then a simple calculation yields
Since j E GnU, it follows from Lemma 7 that F(co,'j)) _ FO However, CO is optimal and thus By Lemma 6, M(cO);>O and so we have M(cO)=O, which is equivalent to condition (viii).
We are now able to identify all of the optimal strategies for the inspectee. Theorem 7 wiII show that if GnU is empty or if g> 0, then the optimal strategies are those described in (c) of Theorem 5. However, when both of these conditions are violated then there is an additional class of optimal strategies. These wiII be described in Theorem 8.
THEOREM 7. If either GnU is empty or g>O then CO is an optimal strategy for the inspectee if and only if CO satisfies conditions (v) through (ix).
PROOF. Let CO be an optimal strategy for the inspectee. By Corollary 5, CO satisfies conditions for all i E Gnu,
for all i E G n W.
PROOF. ° Let CO be a strategy for the inspectee which satisfies conditions (v), (vi), (vii), (xii) and (xiii), where M(c ) be a real number satisfying (4.11). By Lemma 5,
for any strategy p for the inspector. For each i E G n ,set
Then eq (4.12) becomes
Since g=O, it follows from eq (4.3) that
Thus,
(4.14)
Substituting eq (4.14) into eq (4.13) yields
for all strategies p for the inspector, since P; -P k + I-J1(CO);>° for all i E G n T. Thus we have shown that CO is an optimal strategy.
Conversely, let CO be an optimal strategy for the inspectee. By Corollary 5 and Lemma 7, CO satisfies conditions (v), (vi), (vii), (xii) and (xiii) for some Jl(cO);>O. It remains only to show that M(cO) satisfies the right-hand inequality in (4.11). Suppose it does not. Then there exists h E G n T such that Jl(cO) > Ph -P"+I'
that is,
Since Gnu is' not empty, there exists j E GnU and so qj< 1. Define the strategy p for the inspector by
Ph qj
Then which contradicts the fact that CO is an optimal strategy for the inspectee. Hence M(cO) satisfies (4.11). 
Example: Proportional Penalties
Our aim in this section is to illustrate the preceding material by applying it to some simple situation.
Three possibilities suggest themselves for this illustrative role. One is the situation in which all penalties Pi have a common value P. This, however, is precisely Model 1 of our previous paper [2] , and so it need not be repeated here. The other two "scenarios" are both natural generalizations of Example 1: Equal-Sized Firms given in section 3 of [2] . One of them involves a common value V for the cheating-gains Vi; the other postulates a common value q for all the quotients qi= V/ Pi. The latter situation, in which penalties for detected cheating are proportional to gains from cheating, leads to results which are simpler and more readily interpretable and it is also more relevant in the (income-tax return audit) context of [1] . This constant-q situation was therefore selected for presentation below. 
It is interesting to think of the P,.'s as fixed and to see how The optimal strategies pO for the inspector are given by (b) of Theorem S: one should always inspect those devices with penalties greater than the critical level PHI' never inspect those with penalties below this level, and allocate the balance (if any) of his/her effort arbitrarily among the remaining devices. The optimal strategy for the inspectee is given by Theorem 7 (since U is empty), and requires always cheating on every device, a natural conclusion since all devices are tempting. Now suppose that q=l; thus W=N, while T and U are empty. The results are just the limiting case q = 1 of those given above, except for the optimal strategies of the inspectee. Hel she need not always cheat on those devices Di with the higher penalties (Pi> P k + I)' but hel she must do so with high enough probability (c~>PH.I P,) to keep the inspector from diverting effort from certain inspection of these devices to more frequent inspection of the others.
Finally, suppose that q< 1. Thus all devices are untempting (U=N), while T and Ware empty. The right-hand side of (2.7) and (2.8) reduces to nq; thus Case II governs if min <q< 1 Still under the assumption that mln<q<l, the optimal strategies for the inspector are given again by (b) of Theorem 5; again the devices with penalties Pi exceeding the critical level PH I are always to be inspected, while those with lower penalties should be left uninspected. The balance (if any) of inspection resources can be allocated arbitrarily among the remaining devices, Di' subject only to the no-overkill proviso p~ <qi' If either G is empty (i.e., PHI =max i P) or if g=O, then the unique optimal strategy for the inspectee is given by Theorem 7: cheat on the high-penalty devices (Pi>P HI ) with probability PH'; Pi' and always cheat on the other devices. But if g=O and G is non-empty (i.e., there are mlq high-penalty devices), then Theorem 8 shows that the inspectee has an additional one-parameter family of optimal strategies specified by the behavior Pi c~ -PH I =M(cO) on the high-penalty devices Di (and always cheating on the other devices), where the range of the parameter M(cO) is given by (4.11).
The only remaining situations are those with q<mln. As noted above, Case I applies. The game-value FO is 0, by (i) of Theorem 1, so that the inspection-system succeeds in preventing illicit gains by the inspectee. In fact, if q<mln then Theorem 3 shows that the system succeeds in inhibiting all cheating (in optimal behavior) by the inspectee. If q=mln, however, the inspectee has (by Theorem 4) optimal strategies involving cheating on the various devices Di with probabilities inversely proportional to the associated penalties Pi' By Theorem 2, the optimal strategies for the inspector are precisely those in which each device is inspected with probability at least q.
